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1. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has played an important role in security decisions. Recent work using
Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991] to model security domains has been
particularly inﬂuential [Basilico et al. 2009; Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al.
2008; Pita et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2009]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (in this case
the defender) acts ﬁrst and commits to a randomized security policy. The follower
(attacker) optimizes its reward considering the strategy chosen by the leader. These
games are well-suited to representing the problem security forces face in allocating
limited resources, such as oﬃcers, canine units, and checkpoints. In particular, the
fact that the attacker is able to observe the policy reﬂects the way real terrorist
organizations plan attacks using extensive surveillance and long planning cycles.
Stackelberg game models are not just theoretical models; they are at the heart of
deployed decision-support software now in use the the Los Angeles World Airport
(LAWA) police and the United States Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS). A new
application is under development for the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), also using game-theoretic analysis. Moving from theoretical analysis to
applying game theory in real applications posed many new challenged, and there
remain many open questions to be solved in this exciting area of work. In this
article we will highlight several of the main issues that have come up, including
(i) developing eﬃcient algorithms to solve large-scale Stackelberg Security Games,
(ii) evaluating deployed security systems, (iii) knowledge acquisition from security
experts to specify the game models, and (iv) handling mixed-initiative interactions.
We begin with an overview of the deployed systems and then discuss these issues
in turn.
2. DEPLOYED SYSTEMS OVERVIEW: ARMOR, IRIS, AND GUARDS
The ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring Over Routes) system [Pita
et al. 2008] has been in use by the LAWA police at Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX) since August 2007. This system was designed to assist LAWA police
in assigning vehicle checkpoints to inbound roads, and canine units to diﬀerent
airport terminals. ARMOR uses a Bayesian Stackelberg framework to optimally
allocate limited resources based on security information provided by LAWA experts.
The system uses a mixed-initiative software interface to allow police to adjust the
solution returned by the game solver based on any speciﬁc constraints or intelligence
Authors’ addresses: {jpita, bellaman, manishja, kiekintv, fordon, tambe, jasontts}@usc.edu
ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 2009.2 · J. Pita, H. Bellamane, M. Jain, C. Kiekintveld, F. Ord´ o˜ nez, M. Tambe and J. Tsai
for a particular day. Since its deployment, the police have reported an increase
in the number of arrests at the airport for oﬀenses such as drug violations and
concealed ﬁrearms.
The IRIS (Intelligent Randomization In Scheduling) system [Tsai et al. 2009]
was designed to address a similar resource allocation problem for the Federal Air
Marshals Service (FAMS). FAMS has a limited number of air marshals that may be
assigned to protect commercial airline ﬂights. We formulate this as a Stacekelberg
game, similar to the ARMOR formulation in principle. However, this is a massive
scheduling problem involving thousands of personnel, tens of thousands of ﬂights,
and complex constraints. New solution methods were necessary to ﬁnd optimal
allocation strategies for this domain in a reasonable amount of time. The input
necessary for this problem is also signiﬁcantly more complicated, which required
new user interfaces and model elicitation techniques. After an extensive internal
review, IRIS has been used in a pilot deployment since October 2009.
The GUARDS (Game-theoretic Unpredictable and Randomly Deployed Security)
system is currently under development for the Transportation Security Adminis-
tration (TSA). GUARDS will be used to randomize a wide variety of TSA security
activities at airports, and is being designed as a general system for use at any air-
port. The randomization strategy will be based on game-theoretic analysis, as in
ARMOR and IRIS. An initial version of the system is currently undergoing test-
ing at the Pittsburgh International (PIT) and Los Angeles International (LAX)
airports.
3. LESSONS LEARNED AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Our experience working on these real-world security applications has raised issues,
and revealed areas where new research is needed to improve and expand the use
of game-theoretic reasoning in practical situations. The ﬁrst important lesson is
that real domains require fast algorithms that can scale to very large and complex
problems. Computing a Nash equilibrium is hard (PPAD-complete) in the general
case citedaskalakis06,chen06. Results are somewhat more encouraging for Stacekel-
berg games, which can be solved in polynomial time for some cases [Conitzer and
Sandholm 2006]. However, Bayesian Stackelberg games, multiple defense resources,
and other complications can lead to large strategy spaces and diﬃcult computation
problems [Conitzer and Sandholm 2006; Kiekintveld et al. 2009]. The main tra-
jectory of research in developing algorithms for ARMOR, IRIS, and GUARDS has
been to ﬁnd and exploit structure in the games to avoid combinatorial explosions
in representation size and computational requirements [Jain et al. 2007; Paruchuri
et al. 2008; Kiekintveld et al. 2009]. While the algorithms developed so far are
very eﬀective for known real-world problems, there remains much to be done to
develop algorithms that exploit diﬀerent kinds of structure and can be applied to
more general classes of games.
Evaluating deployed security systems such as ARMOR and IRIS is also an im-
portant but challenging problem. It is often not possible to run ideal controlled
experiments in a deployed setting, and laboratory experiments are somewhat un-
satisfying as they abstract away from some features of the problem. We have
developed a framework for multi-faceted evaluation and identiﬁed some of the key
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challenges in evaluating deployed security systems [Taylor et al. 2010], including (i)
there are security concerns with making evaluations of security publicly available,
leading to diﬃculties obtaining data and evaluations from security forces (ii) there
are ethical diﬃculties with experimenting in a deployed setting, especially if this
could lead to not providing the best possible security at all times, and (iii) there
are many external variables that cannot be controlled in any real-world evaluation,
such as economic conditions, geopolitics, the number of travelers, and the num-
ber of planned attacks. To mitigate these diﬃculties, we gather evidence from as
many sources as possible, including qualitative expert evaluations, statistical data
from deployed systems, laboratory experiments with human subjects, and extensive
evidence from simulations [Taylor et al. 2010; Pita et al. 2009].
Another key problem in developing an application using game theory is to elicit
the knowledge necessary to deﬁne a game model. Somehow the data and knowledge
that experts have about possible attack scenarios, the available defense resources,
and the possible outcomes of diﬀerent scenarios must be used to generate an explicit
Stackelberg game model with well-deﬁned actions and payoﬀs. In large domains
like FAMS, this may require specifying thousands or hundreds of thousands of dis-
tinct parameters. One of the important developments was a decomposed preference
elicitation scheme that allowed us to automate much of this process and reduce the
number of parameters that needed to be speciﬁed to a more manageable num-
ber [Tsai et al. 2009]. However, the process of developing a game model is still very
labor intensive, and further improvements in this process would be of great value.
Finally we examine the lessons learned from providing mixed-initiative interac-
tions, where the ﬁnal decisions are the result of a multi-stage interaction between
the user and the software decision aid. Security settings are often ﬂuid and dy-
namic, and it may be impractical to capture all of the necessary special cases in a
general game model. If the system does not allow the security forces the ﬂexibility
to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, it is not likely to be adopted
for everyday use. Therefore, it is necessary to build in mechanisms that allow users
to modify the inputs and even in some cases to alter the ﬁnal suggested schedule
output by the game solver. However, altering schedules can aﬀect the proposed
outcome of a Stackelberg game and addressing these disturbances is an interesting
problem. ARMOR has a mixed-initiative interface that allows such modiﬁcations,
though in practice this capability is rarely used. Including it was important for
building conﬁdence in the system and achieving organization acceptance. Under-
standing theoretically the impact of such mixed-initiative interactions remains an
important open problem.
There is a growing interest in security systems such as ARMOR, IRIS, and
GUARDS in new application domains with additional security agencies. Develop-
ing systems that meet the demands of these new applications will require applying
the existing techniques, but also improving upon these methods and meeting the
new challenges that are sure to arise.
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